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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant UTCO Associates, Ltd. ("UTCO") appeals a 
final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, entered on a jury 
verdict in favor of Appellees Sumerset Houseboats Div. SMI 
("Sumerset") and its President, James E. Sharpe ("Mr. Sharpe").1 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(k)(1997), this Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal as it was poured over by the Utah 
Supreme Court. [R1798]2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in declining to instruct 
the jury on UTCO's equitable promissory estoppel claim despite 
uncontroverted evidence establishing that: 
a) UTCO failed to exhaust its claim in bankruptcy 
against Mr. Zimmerman? 
b) UTCO had a valid, enforceable contract with Mr. 
Zimmerman for repayment of the funds sought from 
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe? 
1
 UTCO's claims against defendant K. Demarr Zimmerman 
("Mr. Zimmerman") were stayed as a result of Mr. Zimmerman's 
bankruptcy and, therefore, they were not submitted to the jury. 
2
 All citations are to the record as indexed by the Clerk 
of the Third Judicial District Court pursuant to Rule 11(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1 
c) UTCO had agreed to loan and had loaned the funds 
to Mr. Zimmerman prior to the alleged promise by 
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe? 
d) UTCO admitted that the money transferred to 
Sumerset was Mr. Zimmerman's money, not that of 
UTCO? 
The standard of appellate review for a trial court's refusal to 
give a proposed jury instruction is a guestion of law for which 
no deference is given to the trial court. E.g., Cornia v. 
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995); State v. Robertson, 923 
P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997)(citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 238 (Utah 1992)). 
2. Did the trial court err in excluding evidence that 
the serial number tentatively reserved for the Zimmerman 
houseboat was, three months after the alleged fraud and after , 
Zimmerman had canceled the purchase, assigned to another boat 
being manufactured for sale to an unrelated third-party? 
The standard of appellate review for a trial court's evidentiary 
ruling is an abuse of discretion and the trial court's ruling is 
given deference in light of its advantageous position. E.g. , Nay 
v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993)("abuse 
of discretion and reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds 
of reasonability"); Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838 
(Utah 1992)("court's rulings regarding admissibility will not be 
overturned 'unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in 
error1"); State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). 
2 
3. If the trial court erred in issuing a ruling 
precluding the introduction of evidence describing the houseboat 
to which the serial number was eventually assigned more than 
three months after the alleged fraudulent representation, was 
UTCO prejudiced as it introduced evidence: (1) That, at the time 
of the alleged fraudulent statement, there was no houseboat in 
existence with the serial number as set forth in the invoice 
between Sumerset and Mr. Zimmerman; (2) That no houseboat with 
that serial number was ever built to the specifications in the 
invoice between Sumerset and Mr. Zimmerman; and (3) That a 
houseboat bearing the serial number initially intended for the 
Zimmerman houseboat was sold to another party? 
The standard of appellate review of a trial court's evidentiary 
rulings is whether there is a "reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings." E.g., State v. 
Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67-70 (Utah 1993)(improper evidence ruling 
reversed only if showing of prejudice (i.e., "reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected outcome of the proceedings")); 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).3 
3
 UTCOfs statement of the issues also sets forth, 
apparently inadvertently, an issue pertaining to an instruction 
given by the trial court pertaining to fraudulent intent. See 
UTCO's Brief of Appellant, Statement of Issues, no. 3 at pp. 3-4. 
UTCO failed to brief the issue, however, so it is not properly 
preserved for appeal and cannot be ruled upon by the Court. E.g., 
Utah R. App. P. 24; State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 
1995); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 710-711 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe 
do not address that issue. 
3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following cases are determinative of the issues 
pertaining to the trial courtfs refusal to instruct the jury on 
UTCO's promissory estoppel claims: Knight v. Post,4 748 P.2d 
1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App. 1988)(pending bankruptcy claims 
against third-party barred equitable claims because of failure to 
exhaust all available legal remedies); Commercial Fixtures and 
Furnishing v. Adams,5 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977)(existence of 
valid contract with third-party to recover debt bars equitable 
claim seeking to imply contract against another)• 
The following Utah Rules of Evidence are determinative 
of the issues pertaining to the trial court's refusal to allow 
evidence pertaining to the reassignment of the serial number: 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; 
irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States of the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Attached as Addendum "A". 
Attached as Addendum "B". 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
UTCO brought this action against Sumerset and Sharpe 
asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 
quantum meruit, contract implied in law, breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, foreclosure 
of security interest, misrepresentation, negligent 
misrepresentation, conspiracy, conversion, implied in fact 
contract, prejudgment interest, and punitive damages• [R561-577] 
These same claims were asserted against Mr. Zimmerman who 
subsequently filed bankruptcy and the action was stayed as to 
him. [R108-109] 
On July 11, 1996, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe filed a 
Motion in Limine which sought the exclusion of evidence: 
(1) that the serial number tentatively reserved for Mr. 
Zimmerman's houseboat was eventually assigned to another 
houseboat more than three months after the alleged 
misrepresentations and after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the order and 
directed Sumerset to apply his $58,384 to Mr. Zimmerman's then 
existing debt owed to Sumerset, and (2) that the second houseboat 
was eventually sold to a third-party. [1486-1490] The grounds 
for this Motion were that these subsequent events were irrelevant 
to UTCOfs claims and, moreover, under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, any probative value would be substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the 
5 
issues, and would unnecessarily lengthen the trial. [Id.] On 
July 22, 1996, UTCO filed a Memorandum in Opposition. [R1744-
1752] On July 22, 1996, the Court granted the Motion and stated: 
I'm going to grant the motion. I can't see any 
relevance to the proposition that the, at least based 
on what I've heard so far, that the reassignment of a 
serial number to another boat, to a third person who is 
not claiming to be involved in this situation, has any 
relevance to the state of mind of the Defendant for 
purposes of committing fraud at the time these 
representations were made. I recognize after events 
may have some probative value, but in this case I can't 
see what it might be. 
The fact that the boat with a serial number did 
not exist, and was never built to the specifications in 
the original invoice, is all the Plaintiff needs in 
that regard. The rest of it is surplusage and a waste 
of time. Unless the evidence changes, it's not coming 
in. The Motion is granted. 
That doesn't mean you can't put in evidence that 
there was never a boat with that serial number, or that 
was the serial number on the invoices and there is no 
such boat, but it's not, I don't see any relevance to 
the fact that serial number now appears on some other 
boat. The Motion is granted. 
[R1910]6 
b
 On July 22, 1996, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe filed two 
additional motions in limine: (1) seeking to exclude any 
reference or mention of any complaint or investigation by any 
government agency, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
which Plaintiff had initiated; and (2) seeking to exclude the 
testimony of two of Plaintiff's belatedly designated witnesses, 
Ellery Summer (Motor Vehicles Employee) and Ken Crooks (F.B.I.). 
[R1541-1547, 1560-1564] In chambers prior to trial, UTCO's 
counsel stated that they did not intend to introduce the evidence 
or call the witnesses these motions sought to exclude. 
Accordingly, these motions in limine became moot and, contrary to 
the representation in UTCO's Brief, were not granted by the trial 
court, or even decided. UTCO did not attempt to call the 
witnesses or introduce the evidence. Given that these motions 
were not ruled upon and the evidence was not offered at trial, 
and given that UTCO's Brief fails to address the merits of these 
motions, they are not properly before this Court on this appeal. 
See, e.g., State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
6 
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• .- . - :-: - - i s t i i c t C o u r t ; :,- H.-^ i -ii. i -.: Timoth;. K. 
Hanson presiding." i::e matter wa.s fried r ^ MPY ; : : rv- "-/!< ?.?, 
2 3 , . r, , "••• . - ... .• -::. .... . O 
volu:,Lai _*• dismiss^: its claim;; tor conversion, quanium meru.it., 
breach of t h<- covenant -f o-• i •'•.-:•• ana id - -i 
' - - . _, ^^J:., and conspiracy . 
(ii . uiy 2 , 199c, alt*ir UTCO rested its <,5is-, Fum^rset 
ctri.* i - M , 3r" r f:" u Defenda** * -e 
^-K^- *r Ling Memoranda i 3 , ..- i D^4 Sumerset anc 
I*. ::.ar^'.: r - I ^ M I r P.: ected Verdict so<rjr* : * imon: "• r::tiir 
i a v . ^  ,. , . .. ^  -v.-1 * < ; . » . .13 . ^~ 
15n '* ijlK-lb-il . K-tie;, i. r iMrectod Verdict "resented * -
ioilo'-'inc bases fei ii recti' : v rciicl •• M::.'^ wy.' 
€•: . » *
 Ijt . •. aim- .'.....: ni^s^ry 
estoppel ~ L a m :*:; b.. :-x:
 t i- TO i.-iiied r«. '•-chaust: t: i - ]:A L 
remedies because ,4 i -iir* * .. 
I • repayment o: x. ;- - . nds sought against ^unv.so: «.•• Mi. 
Sharpe in its equitable clai ms, and claims under thit contract 
were pendi rig ii I bhe bai lkr i lp b i' i I II!i i mipi J.I ni ior 
denied, 8 57 P.2d 9 ; ; ' 
"' Sumerset asserted two counterclaims and a third-party 
complaint which were dismissed, in part voluntarily by Sumerset 
and in part by summary judgment of the Court. Neither the 
counterclaims nor th_ third-party complaint are at issue in this 
appeal , 
l: l
 UTCO f s Brief incorrectly states that the riatter was 
tried by the trial court without a jury. See Brief of Appellant 
at p. 5. To the contrary, the entire ^^.ft-^r ur^ o 1-
 r ' ^^ +-,- a jury, 
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nondischargeability; [R1580-1582] and (2) UTCO's promissory 
estoppel claim is barred as there was no reasonable reliance as 
UTCO had already loaned Mr. Zimmerman the $58,384 prior to any 
alleged promise and UTCO admitted it had no ownership interest in 
that money. [R1573-1575, 1582] The issues raised by Defendants' 
Motion for Directed Verdict were extensively and fully argued by 
all parties. [R2390-2416] . 
While the trial court initially indicated that it was 
denying the Motion for Directed Verdict, [R2416] the trial court, 
based in part on the position asserted in the Motion for Directed 
Verdict, subsequently refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's 
promissory estoppel claim and stated: 
I've indicated in chambers that I was not 
instructing on the equitable causes [sic] of action of 
promissory [sic] estoppel. For the record, the reasons 
I have determined not to do that is, I am satisfied the 
Plaintiffs [sic] have an adequate remedy at law and, I 
believe, it is the rule that equitable remedy is not 
available as long as there is an adequate remedy at 
law. And I believe there is here. 
Also, I am satisfied that the concept promissory 
estoppel basically mirrors the causes of action that 
are being asserted in this case by the Plaintiff. And 
they'll just be surplusage. 
Finally, I'm satisfied that the Court of Appeals 
case that was cited to me by Plaintiff's counsel, 
saying that they seem to suggest that the Court must 
send equitable causes of action to the jury, is 
factually distinguishable in this case and I'm 
satisfied that it would be inappropriate to submit that 
equitable claim to a jury, if it was otherwise proper. 
[R2606-2607] 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed 
on UTCO's claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, punitive 
8 
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. i L
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This appeal ensued. .•' •• 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Sumerset i s a Kentucky corpoxati on engaged :i n the 
< . • - :uj fcuring and selling houseboats, [R1958] and has 
been "n •_: ^r . usiness since 1953. [R1972] Mr, Sharpe was, at 
CIJLX jLeleva lr ' t: 1 1 e Pres:i dent oI: Si iiiierse 1: || 
i .i : . . - i ^ u i i. liii-.it;tiikin, a g a i n s t w h o n thrr: 
act,. •: w a s s t a y e i <• i I<-J':*.!- - * •"•*; b a n k r u p t r*y vi ii-u T-ac" 
[.Li^iids-: i. M s e b c a t s and line; .u . ] wt:^k : y s h a r e s Mi*- h o a r to 
i nd: v i d u a : •:. r * j * ir^-rhar^ ar^on'T *nr^ +^- ^ ] ' r •  - V-6D & 
•\tj')iv:a/ Georgia ar. : then visited Sumerset1^ manufacturing riant 
in Somerset, Kentucky. [ " ' 
months Zimiuerman purchase-., L , ;v i.uusobOiL- : v..iu .>:.«.v. is^t R2126] 
On approximate-1 y Novembei lc*-.: '' Vweiinar, a 
company, Lake Po " - * 
the purchase ot , ^u< . y- ij. iVaiseboa; ' W \ 
connection with this proposed transaction, Sumerset created an 
After t:*i • transaction Sumerset sold four houseboats to 
Mr. Zimmerman and related entities, [R2126] These transactions 
are not at Issu^ i : "a: s litigati on. 
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invoice describing the specifications and amenities of the 
houseboat to be custom built and indicating the purchasers as 
"Lake Powell-N-Houseboats/Demarr [Zimmerman]." [R2048] It was 
anticipated that manufacture of the boat would be completed in 
March, 1993, [R2079] and the purchase price would be 
$120,000.00. [R2051] 
To finance this purchase, Mr. Zimmerman contacted UTCO, 
a lending source he had previously used, seeking $75,000 to be 
paid toward the purchase price. [R2178-2179] UTCO refused to 
make a $75,000 loan to Mr. Zimmerman, but did agree to a loan in 
the amount of $60,000. [R2178-2179] In connection with UTCO's 
loan to Mr. Zimmerman, as was the case with their prior loans, 
Mr. Nelson, UTCO's counsel, prepared a promissory note, security 
agreement, acknowledgement and UCC-1 Financing Statement, which 
were executed by Mr. Zimmerman on December 21, 1992. [R2179-
2181, 2195, 2292, 2582-2583] Sumerset was not a party to these 
agreements nor were these documents provided to Sumerset. 
[R2540-2541] 
Neither Sumerset nor Mr. Sharpe had any business 
dealing directly with UTCO. In fact, Mr. Sharpe testified that 
he did not know UTCO was lending money to Mr. Zimmerman and, for 
all Mr. Sharpe knew, Mr. Nelson was Mr. Zimmerman's lawyer. 
[R2538-2541] 
After the loan was made, Mr. Nelson purports to have 
had two conversations with Mr. Sharpe which serve as the sole 
basis for, inter alia, UTCOfs promissory estoppel claim. With 
10 
r e s p a c !:  t: : • t: 1 1 e s e • :: :: i 1 »/ e r s a t :i o i 1 s, 1 11: N e J s o n t: e s !:  I f i e d a t: t: r i a J a s 
io 1. lows: 
A. I t a 1 k e d t o [ M r S h a r p e ] o n t: 1 i < > 19t h, 2 01 h , 
21st. I don't have a calendar. I don't recall the day 
I talked to him, the week before Christmas, where I 
confirmed to him —- I think the 21st because that's 
the day Zimmerman signed the loan document. I 
confirmed to Mr. Sharpe that UTCO had made the loan, 
that Demarr [Zimmerman] had signed the documents, and 
that we were prepared to wire $60,000 to fund the loai I. 
Q. "Wli.VI! I i.l In; s.jy t y. u," 
A ;e said thdi: : i-: jreat, wi** the money. 
[R21(.-6; see also F220:, *>, 2240] (emphases added). 
Mr iNej * s • - - • i as fo] ] o ; ; s: 
Q. And during that conversation you told Mr. Sharpe 
that ! lr Zi mmerman had signed the loan documents? 
1 \ I believe that I di d, yes. 
Q. A.J ] right. And going on i n your deposition, 
guestion, line 20, page 39. "Just so I understand the 
timing of this conversation, did this occur before or 
after UTCO had made the decision to actually loan funds 
to Mr Zi mmerman? 
"Answei: : I t. was after. 
"Qi i Eistion: Did this conversation occur before or after 
the conversation you had with Mr. Zimmerman in which 
you informed him that UTCO would, in fact, loan him 
$60,000.00? 
The answer was after. Do yen i recal 1 giving those 
answers to those questions during your deposit! on? 
A I don ,t recall the specific questions or answers 
but I have read them, and the answers are correct. 
Q. And that is consistent with your testimony here at 
trial , ri ght? 
A ^ rpj iat i s correct. 
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[R2241-2242] (emphases added)10 
On December 29, 1992, Sumerset received a wire transfer 
in the amount of $58,384. [R2129] That wire transfer indicated 
it was to be applied to "Demarr Zimmerman Account", without 
mention of any particular boat. [R2129-2130, 2272] These funds 
belonged to Mr. Zimmerman and, based on its own admissions, UTCO 
had no interest in these funds wired to Sumerset.11 [R2552-
2553] 
Mr. Zimmerman began making payments to UTCO as required 
under the promissory note, [R2201] however, he failed to pay the 
balance of the loan when it came due in July, 1993. [R2206] 
UTCO instituted this action against Mr. Zimmerman to recover 
payment under the promissory note upon which Mr. Zimmerman had 
defaulted. [R2314] In October of 1993, after this action was 
filed, Mr. Zimmerman filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and UTCO filed 
claims against Mr. Zimmerman in that bankruptcy to recover the 
Mr. Nelson was the only individual associated with UTCO 
that had any discussions with Sumerset or Mr. Sharpe prior to the 
initiation of this litigation. More particularly, Mr. Kent, 
UTCO's sole general partner, expressly testified that he had no 
contact, conversations or communications with Mr. Sharpe at any 
time prior to this action. [R2363] 
11
 With respect to the request for admission, the trial 
court stated to the jury as follows: 
All right. The request is as follows. The Defendant, 
Sumerset, sent to the Plaintiff the following request 
and it reads as follows. 
"Admit that you did not wire any funds to Sumerset 
that belonged to Plaintiff." Plaintiff is, of course, 
UTCO. The answer is, says, "See general objection." 
You don't need to worry about that, "but admitted," 
that it was admitted. 
[R2552-2553] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court Properly Refused To Instruct The Jury 
On UTCO's Equitable Promissory Estoppel Claim. 
The trial court correctly held UTCO had an adequate 
remedy at law and declined to instruct the jury on UTCO's 
equitable claim of promissory estoppel. The only evidence at 
trial was that UTCO loaned the $58,384 to Mr. Zimmerman under an 
express contract to which neither Sumerset nor Mr. Sharpe were 
parties. The uncontroverted evidence also showed that UTCO had 
filed claims against Mr. Zimmerman which were pending in the 
bankruptcy court seeking to collect those very funds, and those 
collection efforts were put on hold while UTCO pursued this 
equitable claim against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe. Under this 
Court's holding in Knight v. Post, 748 P. 2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah 
App. 1988) this attempted end-run around available legal remedies 
cannot be allowed and the trial court properly dismissed the 
equitable promissory estoppel claim. See also Commercial 
Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 
1997)(existence of valid contract with third-party to recover 
debt bars equitable claim seeking to imply contract against 
another). 
The trial court's refusal to instruct on the promissory 
estoppel claim was also proper on the independent bases that the 
evidence conclusively established that UTCO did not reasonably 
rely on the alleged promise as: (1) UTCO had already agreed to 
loan and had loaned the funds to Mr. Zimmerman before the promise 
was purportedly made by Mr. Sharpe; and (2) The funds wired to 
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Sumerset belonged --.•.-]•...••*.. |y to M r . Zimmerman and UTCO had no 
ow ner shi p i • 
The Trial Court Properly Precluded Admission Of 
Evidence Regarding The Assignment Of The Tentatively 
Reserved Serial Number To A Different Boat Three Months 
After The Transaction And Mr, Zimmerman's Cancellation 
Of The Houseboat Purchase. 
Contrary •- UTCO' a imp! i*:.-*r i-^r. i ' : jugh*-;: + its Brief, 
there* was iroffer *r ov M a n c e ox : -• -a* ' • . 
• : . a, :,uence excija^u */v ..,. •.. *.&.. e^ura was 
simp ;y Sumerset*? ! issianin-nr. ..? the serial number tent.it ••;. .^  
res°rv^d for Hi.. i " .s*-1?*'• ^  ; ' ': * * 
alleged misrepresent, at j.a., ,^  a le. Z±.mmerma;: ' :-: cancellation ; *-\-
purchase. That evidence was properly excluded iK"i' r r*-i] - '"' ~-
f I Ill ."ill R u 1 <!i . • ^ > • u. .. ' :i-jiout 
reassigned the sequential s e r i a l number three months a f te r the 
~-ra:ioacf T \ a^  jc—.- h^\ -^a-^]uae:T Leievanc- i i 
pt : a . _i : - a : i , . a a a t e w>-- . ,u t to 
L-vri^nce was le leva. t . 
,1 ... . i wi : a . a a a u ; even J.; . * weie acnehov; deemed 
re levan t , as t ^ evidence v.aiild have created unfair pre judice , 
confusic ' . * 
per t inen t I^SJ^^^, * .•• buu^.r t. ia te i jeer, :i:is <a„ i lenco r> 
attempt ' . ais*- ' rv juestior. t h r /'jmerre* o^m< h ^ l t echnica l ly 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; imb^raa - " : . : • - h^re was n< aviaenc- * .support a 
v io l a t i on i>y Cumerset, the jury wni. .v *-.-* : - -
vast amounts of evidence concerning the propriety of maintaining 
serial numbers in a sequential order and focusing on things that 
occurred three months after the transaction giving rise to UTCO's 
claims. Additionally, the jury would have been confused 
regarding the effect of the evidence and, assuming a violation 
occurred, very probably would have rendered a verdict on that 
fact instead of focusing on the relevant conduct which occurred 
at the time of the transaction between the parties themselves. 
Rule 403 is designed precisely to prevent this type of 
distraction and confusion during a trial and the trial court was 
clearly within its discretion in precluding this evidence. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM. 
The trial court, at the conclusion of the evidence and 
after receiving and hearing argument from all parties on 
Sumerset's and Mr. Sharpe's Motion for Directed Verdict on the 
promissory estoppel claim, refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's 
promissory estoppel claim. A primary basis for declining to 
instruct the jury on this claim (i.e., that UTCO had an adequate 
remedy at law which barred its promissory estoppel claim) mirrors 
the chief basis upon which the Motion for Directed Verdict on the 
promissory estoppel claim was made by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe. 
While the trial court did not expressly reference the immediately 
preceding Motion for Directed Verdict in its ruling, as UTCO 
concedes on appeal "the trial court's failure to cite its basis 
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[i.e., Rule 12 or 41, or directed verdict] for declining to 
instruct the jury on UTCOfs promissory estoppel claim is of no 
moment as this Court pays no deference to the trial court!s legal 
conclusions decided under any of these rules." UTCO's Brief at 
p. 11. The trial court was correct, as a matter of law, in 
declining to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory estoppel 
claim and the judgment should be affirmed. 
A. UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS BARRED AS 
THEY HAD AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW AVAILABLE AND 
FAILED TO EXHAUST THESE LEGAL REMEDIES. 
As a general rule, one must first exhaust his legal 
remedies before he may recover on the basis of an equitable 
claim. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App. 
19 88); Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 
773, 774 (Utah 1977)(exhaustion of remedies required before 
pursuit of any equitable claim); see also UTCO's Brief at p. 16 
("it is true that where there is an adequate remedy at law, no 
equitable remedy will be applied"). As the evidence shows, UTCO 
had an adequate remedy at lav; and that remedy was its claim filed 
in Mr. Zimmerman's pending bankruptcy.12 As a matter of law, 
12
 Despite the briefing and argument before the trial 
court indicating that the legal remedy available to UTCO which 
barred the promissory estoppel claim was UTCO's remedy in Mr. 
Zimmerman's bankruptcy, UTCO!s Brief argues that the trial court 
mistakenly concluded that the available legal remedy was an 
express contract between UTCO and Sumerset. That is simply 
incorrect. The Motion and argument before the trial court, 
including the argument of UTCOfs counsel, [R2411] clearly 
demonstrate that it was not any express contract between UTCO and 
Sumerset that the trial court held was the legal remedy available 
to UTCO. Instead, it was the bankruptcy claim, as had been 
briefed and fully argued to the trial court that served as the 
17 
UTCO's pending claim in Mr. Zimmerman's bankruptcy was a legal 
remedy available to UTCO which barred them from pursuing the 
equitable promissory estoppel claim against Sumerset and Mr. 
Sharpe. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App. 
1988). 
This Court's decision in Knight is dispositive of this 
issue. In Knight, the plaintiff brought an equitable claim 
against defendant for work plaintiff performed for a third-party 
which benefitted defendant. The plaintiff also had filed a claim 
in the third-party's pending bankruptcy. This Court, reversing 
the lower court's judgment against defendant and in plaintiff's 
favor, held as follows: 
As a general rule, one must first 
exhaust legal remedies before he may recover 
on the basis of the equitable doctrine of 
quantum meruit. [citations omitted] The 
legal remedies available to fplaintiff] 
included. . . pursuit of the [third-party's] 
assets as a creditor in the rthird-party'si 
bankruptcy proceeding, neither of which 
[plaintiff] successfully exhausted. 
[Plaintiff] raised his claim in the 
corporation's bankruptcy proceeding, but at 
the time he initiated his lawsuit, he 
modified his claim to recover from the 
corporation only the amount that he did not 
recover from [defendant]. He did not pursue 
his claim in bankruptcy to its end to attempt 
to recover from corporate assets, but brought 
this action during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy action. Neither did he submit 
evidence to the lower court that pursuit of 
the bankruptcy claim would, in all 
basis of its ruling. 
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likelihood, be fruitless. Thus, he did not 
adequately pursue this remedy. 
[Defendant] should not be held liable as 
a consequence of [plaintiff's] failure to 
successfully assert his legal rights. 
Knight, 748 P.2d at 1099-1100 (emphases added). 
That is the identical scenario present in this case. 
The undisputed evidence establishes that UTCO filed claims 
against Mr. Zimmerman in his bankruptcy to recover the same 
$58,384 that is the subject of UTCO's promissory estoppel claim 
against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe. [R2363-2364, 2445-2447] UTCO's 
claims were still pending against Mr. Zimmerman in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, [R2364] and UTCO presented no evidence its claims in 
the bankruptcy would be fruitless. In fact, the only evidence at 
trial established that UTCO would receive a distribution under 
the bankruptcy. [R2447] Additionally, UTCO had filed a 
nondischargeability action in Mr. Zimmerman's bankruptcy which it 
had not pursued to completion and which UTCO stopped pursuing 
pending the outcome of the instant action. [R2448-2449] Thus, 
UTCO had a legal remedy available which it had failed to exhaust 
and, as this Court held in Knight, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe 
"should not be held liable as a consequence of [UTCO's] failure 
to assert its legal rights." Knight, 748 P.2d at 1100. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to instruct the 
jury on the equitable promissory estoppel claim as UTCO had 
failed to exhaust its legal remedies and, therefore, could not 
recover under that claim as a matter of law. 
19 
B. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER BASES UPON WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT !S DENIAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS PROPER AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
Even if Utah law were ignored and it was assumed that 
somehow UTCOfs failure to pursue its claims in Mr. Zimmermanfs 
bankruptcy did not bar its promissory estoppel claim in this 
action, there are several independent legal bases upon which the 
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury was proper and should 
be affirmed.13 They are addressed in turn. 
1. UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS BARRED AS 
THERE WAS AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT BETWEEN UTCO AND 
MR. ZIMMERMAN FOR REPAYMENT OF THE FUNDS AT ISSUE. 
As a matter of law, the trial court also properly 
refused to instruct on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim as UTCO 
had a valid contract with Mr. Zimmerman for repayment of the very 
funds it sought to recover under its promissory estoppel claim. 
Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 
(Utah 1997). This issue was also briefed in connection with the 
Motion for Directed Verdict filed by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and 
was argued to the Court. On this issue, as with the failure to 
exhaust legal remedies, Utah case law is determinative. 
13
 As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the trial court is 
vested with discretion to properly advise the jury, which 
discretion also includes refusing to give instructions when they 
would be inappropriate. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 
567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: It is well recognized that the parties are entitled to 
have their theories of the case presented to the jury in the form 
of instructions, but only if they are supported by the evidence. 
Id. (upholding trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on 
several theories). 
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In Commercial Fixtures, plaintiff sued defendant for 
unjust enrichment seeking to recover for improvements plaintiff 
made to defendant's premises pursuant to a contract with 
defendant's lessee. The lessee was not a party to the action. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of 
the equitable remedy by stating: 
It is also noted that there was an express contract 
between plaintiff and the lessee for the furnishing of 
materials, and when an express agreement exists one may 
not be implied. 
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774, 
UTCO, as did the plaintiff in Commercial Fixtures, asked the 
trial court to imply an agreement between itself and Sumerset or 
Mr. Sharpe, even though the evidence conclusively established 
that UTCO had an agreement with Mr. Zimmerman whereby Mr. 
Zimmerman was already obligated to repay the very funds UTCO was 
seeking to recover. Thus, the trial court!s refusal to instruct 
on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim should be affirmed on this 
additional ground. 
2. UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS PROPERLY NOT 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY 
ESTABLISHED UTCO DID NOT RELY ON THE ALLEGED 
PROMISES. 
As a matter of law, the trial court also properly 
refused to instruct on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim as there 
was no basis upon which a jury could find that UTCO reasonably 
relied upon the promise alleged to have been made by Sumerset. 
This issue was also briefed in connection with the Motion for 
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Directed Verdict filed by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and was argued 
to the Court. 
To prevail on its promissory estoppel claim, UTCO must 
establish that, inter alia, it reasonably relied upon the 
purported promise. E.g., Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 834 P.2d 
1, 4 (Utah 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90. The 
evidence adduced at trial conclusively established that UTCO 
failed to prove this element. 
a. No Reliance As UTCO's Decision To Loan And 
The Loan Itself Was Made Before Alleged 
Promise. 
UTCO's promissory estoppel claim was based on 
Sumerset !s alleged misrepresentation which, a.s described by Mr. 
Nelson, UTCO's counsel and witness,14 occurred in the course of 
phone calls he had with Mr. Sharpe. Mr. Nelson testified on 
direct examination that during the conversation during which the 
alleged promise was made, Mr, Nelson confirmed to Mr. Sharpe that 
UTCO had made the $60,000 loan and Mr. Zimmerman had signed the 
documents. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Nelson then confirmed twice 
that his own deposition testimony accurately reflected the timing 
of the conversation he had with Mr. Sharpe: 
Q. Just so I understand the timing of this 
conversation, did this conversation occur before 
14
 Mr. Nelson was the only witness presented at trial with 
any personal knowledge of the alleged promise. UTCO had conceded 
that no one other than Mr. Nelson had any communications with 
anyone from Sumerset regarding this transaction. 
22 
or after UTCO had made the decision to actually 
loan funds to Mr. Zimmerman? 
A. After. 
Q. Did this conversation occur before or after the 
conversation you had with Mr. Zimmerman in which 
you informed him that UTCO would in fact loan him 
$60,000? 
A. After. 
Thus, the undisputed evidence established that UTCO!s decision to 
loan $60,000 to Mr. Zimmerman and the loan itself occurred before 
the alleged promise. Accordingly, as a matter of law, there was 
no evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that UTCO 
relied (reasonably or otherwise) on the alleged promise 
underlying the promissory estoppel claim. E.g. , Weese v. Davis 
County Commfn, 834 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1992)(promissory estoppel 
requires showing of reasonable reliance). UTCO had already 
committed to make the loan, and had already made the loan when 
the purported promise was made to Mr. Nelson. Accordingly, as a 
matter of law UTCO did not reasonably rely on the promise and the 
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory 
estoppel claim must be affirmed. 
b. No Reliance As UTCO Had No Interest In The 
Funds Wired To Sumerset. 
As a matter of law, the trial court also properly 
refused to instruct on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim as there 
was no reliance as Mr. Zimmerman, not UTCO, owned the funds wired 
to Sumerset. The undisputed evidence, including UTCO's own 
admission, established that UTCO had no ownership interest in the 
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funds that were wired to Sumerset. Moreover, as discussed above, 
UTCO agreed to make the loan and made the loan before the alleged 
promise. Accordingly, there simply was no detriment suffered by 
UTCO as a result of any alleged promise and the promissory 
estoppel claim failed as a matter of law. 
3. UTCO'S ARGUMENT ON THIS ISSUE IS INAPPLICABLE AS 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL CLAIM ON LEGAL GROUNDS AND THE CLAIM WAS 
NEITHER SUBMITTED TO THE JURY NOR DECIDED BY THE 
COURT. 
The argument set forth in UTCOfs Brief in support of 
its claim on appeal that the trial court did not properly 
instruct the jury can be summarized as follows: The parties 
consented that the promissory estoppel claim would be tried to a 
jury instead of the court even though it is an equitable claim 
upon which a jury trial as a matter of right is not allowed. 
UTCO then sets forth authority for the proposition that parties 
can consent to a jury trial on equitable claims and if they do so 
the trial court should not decide at the last minute that it, not 
the jury, will be deciding the claim. From this premise, UTCO 
makes the nonsequitur argument that since the parties agreed that 
the claim would be tried to a jury that it was error for the 
trial court not to instruct them even though the claim was 
insupportable as a matter of law. That is not the law. 
Under UTCOfs logic, once both parties to a case consent 
to have a jury trial on an issue, the court could not refuse to 
let that case go to the jury for any reason. That would vitiate 
summary judgments, motions to dismiss, and directed verdicts. 
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UTCO's position is simply wrong. While it is true that a case 
which proceeds through trial being tried to the jury should be 
decided by the jury as opposed to the court, that rule of law 
does not preclude a court from dismissing the claim if it is 
legally improper despite the parties1 consent to a jury trial. 
UTCO fails to cite a single case for the proposition that a court 
cannot dismiss a claim as a matter of law even though the parties 
consented to a jury trial. To the contrary, courts routinely and 
properly dismiss promissory estoppel (and other equitable claims) 
when they are not supported by evidence or law under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. E.g., State Bank of Southern Utah v. 
Troy Hygro Sys., Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1274-1275 (Utah App. 
1995)(affirmed summary judgment on promissory estoppel claim 
where claim failed as a matter of law); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 
764, 768-769 (Utah 1991)(affirmed motion to dismiss where 
promissory estoppel claim failed as a matter of law); American 
Towers Owners Ass!n, Inc. v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 
1192-1193 (Utah 1996)(affirmed summary judgment on equitable 
claim where legal remedy available); Commercial Fixtures and 
Furnishing, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977)(same). 
Accordingly, the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on 
the promissory estoppel claim was proper as a matter of law and 
the Judgment should be affirmed. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PRECLUDED EVIDENCE THAT THE 
SERIAL NUMBER TENTATIVELY RESERVED FOR MR. ZIMMERMAN'S 
HOUSEBOAT WAS REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER BOAT MORE THAN 
THREE MONTHS AFTER THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION AND 
AFTER MR. ZIMMERMAN CANCELED THE SALE, 
Prior to trial, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe filed a Motion 
in Limine seeking to exclude the introduction of the following 
evidence: 
(1) That the serial number tentatively assigned to the 
Zimmerman houseboat was reassigned more than three 
months after the alleged misrepresentation, and 
after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the sale and 
instructed Sumerset to apply the funds to his 
then-existing debt owed to Sumerset; and 
(2) That thereafter the second, different houseboat 
was sold to a third-party. 
The Motion in Limine sought exclusion of this evidence under 
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
UTCO, in response to the Motion just as in its Brief on 
appeal, was unable to articulate how this evidence concerning 
conduct occurring three months after the transaction at issue was 
relevant in any manner. Instead UTCO simply repeats the general 
proposition that the court, in a fraud case, is to consider all 
facts and circumstances. That explanation simply begs the 
question. For instance, under UTCOfs conclusory logic the trial 
court would err in excluding evidence that Sumersetfs production 
facility was painted a different color in March, 1993. While 
equally irrelevant, it is a fact and circumstance that under 
UTCO!s logic would have to be presented to the jury. UTCO's 
position notwithstanding, fraud allegations are subject to the 
evidentiary requirements and limitations set forth in the Utah 
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Rules of Evidence as are all other claims.15 E.g., State v. 
Winward/ 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995)(Evidence of 
misconduct surrounding subsequent sale of property, sought to 
show fraudulent intent, was properly precluded under the Utah 
Rules of Evidence.) 
UTCO's inability to articulate the relevance of 
this evidence simply left the trial court without an explanation 
as to how something which occurred more than three months after 
the cancellation of the transaction at issue could have any 
possible relevance. After briefing and substantial argument to 
the court, the trial court granted the Motion and explained: 
I'm going to grant the motion. I can't see any 
relevance to the proposition that the, at least based 
on what I've heard so far, that the reassignment of a 
serial number to another boat, to a third person who is 
not claiming to be involved in this situation, has any 
relevance to the state of mind of the Defendant for 
purposes of committing fraud at the time these 
representations were made. I recognize after events 
may have some probative value, but in this case I can't 
see what it might be. 
The fact that the boat with a serial number did 
not exist, and was never built to the specifications in 
the original invoice, is all the Plaintiff needs in 
that regard. The rest of it is surplusage and a waste 
15
 UTCO's true intention for introducing this evidence was 
to create unfair prejudice and confusion. It is clear that UTCO 
intended to use the evidence to attempt to create a question 
regarding some perceived technical violation of the hull 
identification statute and then have the jury base its decision 
on this purported technical violation [R1519] instead of the 
actual issue in this case — namely, Sumerset's and Mr. Sharpe's 
conduct toward UTCO which the jury ruled upon and found did not 
support UTCO's claims. While Sumerset disputes any violation of 
any law, it would be irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial and simply 
confuse the jury even if it were deemed to have occurred. Thus, 
the evidence was properly precluded. 
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of time. Unless the evidence changes, it's not coming 
in. The Motion is granted. 
That doesn't mean you can't put in evidence that 
there was never a boat with that serial number, or that 
was the serial number on the invoices and there is no 
such boat, but it's not, I don't see any relevance to 
the fact that serial number now appears on some other 
boat. The Motion is granted. 
[R1910] 
In reviewing the trial court's evidentiary ruling, 
deference is given to the trial court's advantageous position in 
making this ruling and its decision will be affirmed unless "it 
clearly appears that the lower court was in error." E.g., Heslop 
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992); cf. Nay v. 
General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993)("reverse 
only if the ruling is beyond the bounds of rationality"). 
A. THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 402 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AS IT WAS PATENTLY 
IRRELEVANT. 
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly 
provides that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." The trial court clearly acted within its discretion 
when it precluded the introduction of this evidence on the 
grounds it was irrelevant. 
UTCO brought this action asserting claims for breach of 
contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and other 
miscellaneous claims arising out of the canceled sale of a 
houseboat by Sumerset to Mr. Zimmerman. UTCO's claim is centered 
on a $60,000 loan it made to Mr. Zimmerman, a portion of which 
was forwarded to Sumerset in December, 1992 to be applied to 
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"Demarr Zimmerman Account." A few months later, Mr. Zimmerman 
canceled the purchase and directed Sumerset to apply the $58,384 
to Mr. Zimmerman's then-existing debt owed to Sumerset. Sumerset 
then "sidetracked" the production of the houseboat Mr. Zimmerman 
had ordered. 
After Mr. Zimmerman canceled the purchase and the 
houseboat at issue was sidetracked, and more than three months 
after any alleged misrepresentation, Sumerset assigned the serial 
number initially reserved for Mr. Zimmerman's houseboat to 
another entirely different boat eventually sold to a third-party. 
The assignment of the serial number to a different houseboat and 
the sale of that boat to a third-party all occurred more than 
three months after the transaction at issue in UTCO's claims and 
that evidence is irrelevant to any of UTCO's claims. Therefore, 
the evidence was properly precluded under Rule 402 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
At trial, UTCO was allowed to introduce all evidence 
that had any potential relevance to its claims. UTCO introduced 
the following evidence: 
1) The houseboat at issue was never constructed; 
fE.g., R1910, 1928, 2097-2098] 
2) The houseboat at issue did not exist on the date 
Sumerset received Mr. Zimmerman1s $58,384; [Id.] 
3) There was no houseboat constructed matching the 
MSO and invoice created for Mr. Zimmerman's 
houseboat; [Id.] 
4) The houseboat at issue never existed; [R1910, 
1929, 2097-2098] 
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5) The houseboat described in the November, 1992 
invoice with the serial number in that invoice was 
never manufactured by Sumerset; [R1910, 2097-2098] 
6) The houseboat with the serial number on the 
Zimmerman invoice and MSO was sold to someone 
else. [R2210] 
All evidence potentially relevant to the issues in this case was 
presented to the jury. What happened to the houseboat's serial 
number several months after the alleged misrepresentation and 
several months after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the sale of the 
houseboat is patently irrelevant; thus, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in precluding its introduction. 
B. THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 403 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AS ITS INTRODUCTION 
WOULD HAVE CREATED CONFUSION OF THE ISSUES AND 
UNFAIR PREJUDICE, AND WOULD HAVE BEEN A WASTE OF 
TIME. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. 
As under Rule 402, it was within the trial court's discretion to 
preclude this evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Even assuming there was some probative value to the 
subsequent assignment of the serial number to another houseboat 
months later, that probative value would have been substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the 
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issues, and would have unnecessarily lengthened the trial by 
several days. UTCO's apparent motivation in seeking to introduce 
evidence of the subsequent reassignment of the serial number and 
sale was to prejudice Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and introduce 
confusion into the issues. UTCO intended to use this evidence to 
attempt to create some question that Sumerset subsequently 
violated the law regarding assignment and affixing of hull 
identification numbers to the Zimmerman houseboat or the second, 
different houseboat. [R1519] Such a use of this irrelevant 
evidence would directly violate Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, particularly where there is no evidence of any 
alteration or changing of a serial number but merely a 
reassignment on paper of a serial number to avoid a gap in serial 
numbers. While Sumerset (which has been in the houseboat 
business for nearly 45 years) did not violate any laws in this 
transaction, even assuming that more than three months after the 
transaction at issue Sumerset somehow technically violated a 
statute regarding the assigning of hull identification numbers, 
the evidence would have been irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, 
and result in nothing but confusion. The relevant issues for the 
jury to determine were whether the acts of Sumerset and Mr. 
Sharpe were fraudulent as to UTCO, not whether Sumerset later 
broke the law or defrauded some third-party. E.g., State v. 
Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995). 
If UTCO had been allowed to introduce evidence of the 
reassigning of the serial number months later, Sumerset and Mr. 
31 
Sharpe would have been forced to counter that evidence 
demonstrating why their subsequent actions were proper. This 
would have entailed several witnesses, substantial costs and 
expenses, and would have consumed a number of trial days. 
Additionally, it would have been unlikely that the jury would 
have perceived that its verdict should not turn on whether the 
subsequent reassignment of the serial number was proper, 
especially after the bulk of the trial would have been focused on 
this issue which is tangentially related, at best. It is 
precisely this type of confusing and prejudicial sidetrack that 
Rule 403 was designed to prevent. See McCormick, Evidence § 185; 
State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995)(evidence 
sought to prove fraudulent intent properly precluded under Rule 
403 where the proffered evidence posed risk of diverting jury's 
attention from pertinent issue and would prejudice defendant); 
West v, Carson, 49 F.3d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1995). 
Thus, based on the foregoing the trial court's ruling 
excluding the evidence of the subsequent reassignment of the 
serial number to a second, different houseboat that was 
eventually sold was within the trial court's discretion and was 
proper under the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court properly declined to instruct the jury 
on UTCO's equitable promissory estoppel claim as UTCO failed to 
exhaust its legal remedies, had a valid contract with Mr. 
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Zimmerman for repayment of the funds, and, moreover, failed to 
rely on the alleged promise. The trial court also acted within 
its discretion in precluding UTCO from introducing evidence of 
the subsequent reassignment of the serial number tentatively 
reserved for Mr. Zimmerman's houseboat to another boat three 
months after the transaction at issue and after Mr. Zimmerman 
canceled the purchase. That ruling was proper under Rules 402 
and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, the Judgment 
rendered in favor of Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe by the jury should 
be affirmed and this appeal dismissed. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 1997. 
ATKIN & LILJA 
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*1097 748 P.2d 1097 
Stan KNIGHT, dba Stanco Insulation Services, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
George P. POST, dba Post Petroleum Company, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 860120-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 22. 1988. 
Company contracted with corporate operator of oil 
well to improve oil well site. When corporate 
operator did not pay and filed bankruptcy, company 
brought action against proprietorship which owned 
working interest in oil well to recover for services 
performed in improving oil well. The Seventh 
District Court, Uintah County, Richard C. Davidson, 
J., found in favor of company on basis of quantum 
meruit, and proprietorship appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Garff, J., held that restitution based on 
quantum meruit was improper where company failed 
to first exhaust legal remedies, company did not show 
that proprietorship had been unjustly enriched, and 
company had no contractual relationship, either 
express or implied, with proprietorship. 
Reversed. 
1. APPEAL AND ERROR <£=>845(2) 
30 -— 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, :r. 
General 
30k844 Review Dependent on Mode oi Trial 
in Lower Court 
30k845 In General 
30k845(2) Cases submitted below on agreed 
case or statement. 
Utah App. 1988. 
Where parties have stipulated facts for purposes of 
appeal, reviewing court does not apply clearly 
erroneous standard but will sustain court's decision 
only if convinced of its correctness. 
2. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS 
<®^30 
205H — 
205HI Nature and Grounds oi Obligation 
205HI(C) Services Rendered 
205Hk30 Work and labor in general; quantum 
Copyright (c) West Crroup 1997 N< 
meruit. 
Utah App. 1988. 
One must first exhaust legal remedies before he may 
recover on basis of equitable doctrine of quantum 
meruit. 
3. MINES AND MINERALS <©=> 109 
260 — 
260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells 
260111(C) Rights and Liabilities Incident tc 
Working 
260kl09 Contracts for testing or working. 
Utah App. 1988. 
Company which made improvements on oil well site 
pursuant to contract between company and corporate 
operator of well and which did not receive payment 
for work could not seek recovery on basis of quantum 
meruit since company did not first exhaust legal 
remedies where company failed to bring action 
enforcing mechanics' lien within statutory period, 
company did not pursue claim in bankruptcy to its end 
when corporate operator filed for bankruptcy, and 
company did not submit evidence to lower court that 
pursuit of bankruptcy claim would be fruitless. 
4. BANKRUPTCY <®=»2397(1) 
51 _ 
51IV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief: Injunction 
and Stay 
51IV(B) Automatic Stay 
5lk2394 Proceedings, Acts, or Persons 
Affected 
5lk2397 Mortgages or Liens 
Slk2397(l) In general. 
[Sec headnote text below] 
4. MECHANICS' LIENS <S=*260(4) 
257 — 
257X1 Enforcement 
257k260 Time to Sue, Limitations, and Laches 
257k260(4) Commencement of suit. 
Utah App. 1988. 
Corporation's bankruptcy action does not necessarily 
preclude recovery under properly filed mechanics' 
lien nor does it toll requirement of bringing action to 
enforce such lien within statutory 12-month period. 
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5, 38-1-11. 
5. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS 
<S=^30 
205H — 
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(C) Services Rendered 
205Hk30 Work and labor in general; quantum 
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meruit. 
Utah App. 1988. 
Two branches of quantum meruit are contracts 
implied in law, also known as quasi-contracts or 
unjust enrichment, which are not actions to enforce 
contract but are actually actions to require restitution, 
and contracts implied in fact, which are contracts 
established by conduct. 
6. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS 
<@^2.1 
205H — 
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(A) In General 
205Hk2 Constructive or Quasi Contracts 
205Hk2.1 In general. 
Formerly 205Hk2 
[See headnote text below] 
6. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS 
205H — 
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(A) In General 
205Hk2 Constructive or Quasi Contracts 
205Hk3 Unjust enrichment. 
Utah App. 1988. 
To prevail under theory of contract implied in law or 
unjust enrichment, plaintiff must show that plaintiff 
conferred benefit upon defendant, defendant was 
aware of benefit, and defendant retained benefit under 
such circumstances as to make it inequitable for him 
to retain benefit without payment of its value. 
7. MINES AND MINERALS <S^109 
260 — 
260IQ Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells 
260111(C) Rights and Liabilities Incident to 
Working 
260kl09 Contracts for testing or working. 
Utah App. 1988. 
Although company conferred benefit of 
improvement of oil well site upon proprietorship 
which owned working interest in oil well, company 
did not show that proprietorship retained benefit under 
circumstances that would make it inequitable for it to 
retain benefit without payment of its value where 
company introduced no evidence to indicate that 
proprietorship requested services of company or 
deliberately misled it. 
8. MINES AND MINERALS <S^109 
260 — 
260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells 
260111(C) Rights and Liabilities Incident to 
Working 
260kl09 Contracts for testing or working. 
Utah App. 1988. 
Company failed to show that there was either 
express or implied contract between it and 
proprietorship owning working interest in oil well on 
which company made improvements for which it was 
never paid where company did not know of 
proprietorship's existence at time it entered into 
contract with corporate operator of well and so could 
not have had any direct dealings including express 
contract with proprietorship. 
9. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS 
<@=*35 
205H — 
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(C) Services Rendered 
205Hk33 Rendition and Acceptance of Services 
in General 
205Hk35 Effect of request or promise to pay. 
Utah App. 1988. 
Required elements of recovery on theory of contract 
implied in fact are that defendant requested plaintiff to 
perform work, plaintiff expected defendant to 
compensate him, and defendant knew or should have 
known that plaintiff expected compensation. 
10. MINES AND MINERALS <@=>109 
260 — 
260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells 
260111(C) Rights and Liabilities Incident to 
Working 
260kl09 Contracts for testing or working. 
Utah App. 1988. 
Company did not have implied-in-fact contract with 
proprietorship which owned working interest in oil 
well on which company had made improvements 
pursuant to contract with corporate operator of well 
where company did not know of or deal with 
proprietorship prior to bankruptcy proceedings of 
corporate operator of well, proprietorship did not 
request company to perform work or expect to pay 
him because proprietorship did not deal with 
company, and company could not have expected 
proprietorship to pay it because it did *1097 not 
know of proprietorship's existence. 
*1098 F. Alan Fletcher (argued), Pruitt, Gushee & 
Fletcher, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
John R. Anderson (argued), Vernal, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
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Betore BILLINGS, GARFF and JACKSON. JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
The trial court found defend ant/ appell ant, George P 
Post, a part owner of an oil well, liable tor labor and 
materials provided by pi ainti it/respondent, Stan 
Knight, to improve the oil well site pursuant to a 
contract between Knight and the corporate operator of 
the well. Post seeks reversal ot the judgment. 
The parties agreed to the toll owing statement ot the 
record on appeal: Knight conducted an insulation 
business known as Stanco Insulation Services. Post, 
doing business under a proprietorship named Post 
Petroleum Company, owned a 33.75% working 
interest in an oil well located in Umtah County, Utah 
Post Petroleum Company, Inc. (the corporation), was 
the corporate operator ot the oil well. The 
corporation is not a party to this action and is a 
separate entity from Post's proprietorship. 
In March 1982, Knight orally contracted with the 
corporation to furnish labor and materials tor 
insulating an oil tank battery and erecting two 
buildings at the well site At rhis time, he was 
unaware ot the existence of the proprietorship, Post 
Petroleum Company, and did not know who ownea 
the well. He satisfactorily completed the contracted 
work between March 18, 1982 and April 26, 1982. 
and then, according to instructions given by the 
corporation's president. *1099 Larry McLane, 
submitted his invoice for S 18,437.13 to the 
corporation. There was no dispute that this was a 
reasonable price for the work. Knight did not deal 
with George Post personally during the course ot this 
work, nor was he aware of any rclatioaship between 
the corporation and Post Petroleum Company. 
The corporation never paid Knight, and, in the 
course ot his several inquiries about the unpaid bill 
with McLane, Knight was never advised that he 
should bill any other party. However, both Post and 
the corporation knew that Knight was billing the 
corporation and not the proprietorship. 
On July 14, 1982, Knight, unaware that the 
corporation had no possessory interest in the oil well, 
attempted to record a mechanics' lien on the oil well 
property, but placed an incorrect property description 
on his lien. 
Several months later, the corporation filed a petition 
in bankruptcy. On January 10, 1983, Knight filed a 
creditor's claim against the corporation in the 
bankruptcy proceedings, seeking payment of the entire 
amount due. Subsequently, Knight learned that tne 
corporation had no interest in the well location, but 
was merely the operator of the well, and that George 
Post had an ownerslup interest in the well. 
In March 1983, Post Petroleum Company, Post's 
proprietorship, which had taken over operation ct the 
well, contracted with Knight to do additional work on 
the well tor which it paid him $395.60. Knight then 
sought payment from Post on his $18,437.13 claim, 
but was refused. Knight initiated this lawsuu, seeking 
to recover the $18,437.13 claim, 18% interest, and 
S2,500 in attorney tees trom Post. He then amended 
nis still-pending bankruptcy claim, seeking only those 
sums which he did not recover from Post. 
The trial court found in favor of Knight on the basis 
ot quantum meruit, reasoning that the relationship 
between George Post and the corporation had unjustly 
confused Knight as to the proper party from whom to 
seek payment, and that Post was the ultimate 
beneticiary ot the contract between Knight and the 
corporation. However, the couit reduced tne amount 
due Knight under the contract by the 66 25 "6 ot the 
well owned by non-parties tc the lawsuit. 
On appeal, Post argues that the trial court erred m 
awarding judgment against him on the basis of 
quantum meruit We agree, reverse the trial court, 
and find that restitution based on quantum meruit was 
improper because: (1) Knight tailed to first exhaust 
his legal remedies, (2) Knight did not introduce 
sutticient evidence to show that Post had been uijustiy 
enriched; and (3) there was nc contractual 
relationship, either express or implied, Dexween 
Knight and Post. 
[1] The Utah Supreme Court, m Sacramento 
Baseball Club, Inc. v. The Great Northern Baseball 
Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987)(citation 
omitted), stated that "[w]hen a trial court relies on 
stipulated facts to decide a case, this Court does not 
apply the clearly erroneous standard, but will sustain 
the lower court's decision only if convinced of its 
correctness. Thus, we examine the facts de n o v o / 
Although, in the present case, the parties have 
stipulated facts for the purposes of appeal, we see no 
distinction, and the standard of review remains the 
same. Christensen v. Abbott, 671 P.2d 121, 123 
(Utah 1983). Thus, we review both factual and legal 
issues 
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I 
Failure to Exhaust Legal Remedies 
[2][3][4] As a general rule, one must first exhaust 
his legal remedies before he may recover on the basis 
of the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. See 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 
1382, 1388 (Utah 1982); Commercial Fixtures and 
Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 
1977). The legal remedies available to Knight 
included a mechanics' lien on the well property and 
pursuit of the corporation's assets as a creditor in the 
corporation's bankruptcy proceeding, neither of which 
Knight successfully exhausted. 
*1100 Knight failed to perfect his mechanics' lien 
against Post because he incorrectly described the 
affected property, thus not complying with Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 38-1-7 (1981). See Westinghouse Hec. 
Supply Co. v. W. Seed Prod. Corp., 119 Ariz. 377, 
580 P.2d 1231, 1233 (App.1978); Buehner Block Co. 
v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 520-21 
(1957). 
Further, Knight failed to bring an action enforcing 
the lien within the statutory period. Under Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 38-1-11 (1974), (FN1) an action to enforce 
a mechanics' lien must be commenced within twelve 
months from the completion of the work. An 
untimely action under this section is jurisdictional and 
forecloses the parties' rights. (FN2) AAA Fencing 
Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 
290-91 (Utah 1986); Morrison v. Carey-Lombard 
Co., 9 Utah 70, 33 P. 238, 239 (1893). Therefore, 
Knight did not exhaust this remedy, and, at this point 
in time, may not because his rights and remedies 
under the mechanics' lien statutes are extinguished. 
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774. 
Knight raised his claim in the corporation's 
bankruptcy proceeding, but at the rime he initiated this 
lawsuit, he modified his claim to recover from the 
corporation only the amount that he did not recover 
from Post. He did not pursue his claim in bankruptcy 
to its end to attempt to recover from corporate assets, 
but brought this action during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy action. Neither did he submit evidence to 
the lower court that pursuit of the bankruptcy claim 
would, in all likelihood, be fruitless. Thus, he did not 
adequately pursue this remedy. 
Post should not be held liable as a consequence of 
Knight's failure to successfully assert his legal rights. 
See Utschig v. McClone, 16 Wis.2d 506. 114 
N.W.2d 854 (1962). As in Commercial Fixtures, 
Knight has failed to exhaust his legal remedies, so 
may not recover on the basis of quantum meruit. 
II 
Quantum Meruit 
Because the trial court based its ruling upon 
quantum meruit, we address that question even though 
our ruling on failure to exhaust legal remedies is 
dispositive of the case. 
[5] In Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1987), this Court has identified two branches 
of quantum meruit: (1) contracts implied in law, also 
known as quasi-contracts or unjust enrichment, which 
are not actions to enforce a contract but are actually 
actions to require restitution; and (2) contracts 
implied in fact, which are contracts established by 
conduct. Knight cannot prevail under either of these 
branches. 
[6] First, to prevail under the first branch of 
quantum meruit, contracts implied in law or unjust 
enrichment, Knight mast show the following three 
elements: (1) Knight conferred a benefit upon Post: 
(2) Post was aware of the benefit; and (3) Post 
retained the benefit under such circumstances as to 
make it inequitable for him to retain the benefit 
without payment of its value. Berrett v. Stevens, 690 
P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984); Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. 
[7] It is undisputed that Knight conferred a benefit 
upon Post and that Post knew about and was using the 
benefit. However, Knight did not show that Post 
*1101. retained the benefit under circumstances that 
would make it inequitable for him to retain it without 
payment of its value. In Commercial Fixtures, the 
Utah Supreme Court defined inequitable 
circumstances as: 
[t]he mere fact that a third person benefits from a 
contract between two others does not make such 
third person liable in quasi-contract, unjust 
enrichment, or restitution. There must be some 
misleading act, request for services, or the like, to 
support such an action. Mere failure of 
performance by one of the contracting parties does 
not give rise to a right of restitution. 
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
Knight relies upon the reasoning in Paschall's, Inc. 
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v. Dozier, 219 Term. 45, 407 S.W.2d 150 (1966), 
which states that recovery on a quantum meruit action 
may be had in some instances in winch a materialman 
or subcontractor furnishes labor or materials which 
benetit the property of a person with whom there is 
not privity of contract. However, this is at variance 
with Commercial Fixtures. 
Knight introduced no evidence to indicate that Post 
requested services ot Knight or deliberately misled 
him In tact, the parties stipulated that Knight did not 
even know of Post's existence until after the 
corporation had filed for bankruptcy. The only 
evidence introduced even suggesting a misleading act 
is the similarity in names between the corporation and 
the proprietorship. While we recognize the possibility 
that Post created a corporation and a proprietorship 
with the same name to deliberately detraud creditors, 
it and when the corporation went bankrupt, Knight 
has not introduced any such evidence. There tore, he 
has not shown that it would be inequitable tor Post to 
retain the benefit without payment ot its value. 
[8] Second, Knight has failed to show that there is 
either an express or implied contract between himstlr 
and Post, on which he may base recovery. See 
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774 
The stipulated facts indicate that Knight did not 
know ot Post's existence at the time he entered into 
the contract, so could not have had any dnect 
dealings, including an express contract, with Post. 
[9][10] Also, Knight did not prove the required 
elements of the second branch ot quantum meruit. 
contracts implied in fact, to show the existence of an 
implied contract with Post To prevail under this 
theory, Knight was required to show that (1) Post 
requested Knight to perform the work, (2) Knight 
expected Post to compensate him; and (3) Post knew 
or should have known that Knight expected 
compensation. Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. 
The facts indicate that Knight did not know of or 
deal with Post prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, so 
Post did not request Knight to perform the work or 
expect to pay him because he did not deal with 
Knight, and Knight could not have expected Post to 
pay him becaase he did not know of Post's existence 
On the contrary, Knight had an express contract 
with the corporation, and dealt exclusively with it in 
contracting to do the work, attempting to collect his 
bill, and filing his mechanics' lien. Thus, Knight did 
not have an implied contract with Post. See 
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774. 
Since there was no express or implied contract with 
Post, Knight cannot recover. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed Costs 
awarded to Post. 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
FN1. This statute reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must 
be begun within twelve months alter the complexion 
ot the original contract.... Within the twelve months 
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for 
record with the county recorder of each county in 
which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency 
of the action, in the manner provided m actions 
affecting the title or right to possession of real 
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to 
persons who have been made parties to the action 
and persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action 
FN2. We note that the corporation's bankruptcy 
action did not necessarily preclude recovery under a 
properly filed mechanics' lien nor did it toll the 
requirement of bringing an action to enforce such a 
hen within the statutory twelve month period. See 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 38-1-5 (1974); Munson v 
Risinger, 114 So.2d 59, 61 (La.Ct.App. 1959). 
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COMMERCIAL FIXTURES AND 
FURNISHINGS, I N C , a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Eldon ADAMS, an Individual, and New Life 
Health Spa, by and 
through Eldon Adams, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 14700. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 13, 1977. 
A supplier of materials incorporated into leased 
property at the request of the tenant brought an action 
against the landlord after default under the lease had 
occurred, seeking recovery for the value of the 
materials under a theory of unjust enrichment. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County. George E. Ballif. 
J., entered summary judgment for the landlord, and 
the supplier appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J.. 
held that no basis for recovery was shown. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion in which 
Crockett, J., concurred. 
1. MECHANICS' LIENS <£=>63 
257 —-
257II Right to Lien 
25711(C) Agreement or Consent of Owner 
257k60 Necessity for Contract or Consent by 
Owner 
257k63 Improvements by lessee. 
Utah 1977. 
As general rule, tenant's creditors have no greater 
right to charge land with value of improvements .or 
repairs than tenant would have. 
2. CONTRACTS <@=> 188 
95 — 
95II Construction and Operation 
9511(B) Parties 
95kl88 Duties and liabilities of third persoas. 
Utah 1977. 
Mere fact that third person benefits from contract 
between two others does not make such third person 
liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or 
restitution; there must be some misleading act, 
request for services, or the like, to support such 
action, and mere failure of performance by one of the 
contracting parties does not give rise to right of 
restitution. 
3. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS 
<®^31 
205H — 
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(C) Services Rendered 
205Hk31 Materials furnished. 
Formerly 412k3 WORK AND LABOR 
Utah 1977. 
Where tenant, who had agreed in lease to complete 
such improvements in and upon leased property as its 
business needs might require and to pay and discharge 
all costs and expenses incident thereto to the end that 
no liens would be placed on leased property, 
contracted with supplier for certain materials, which 
were incorporated into leased premises, and then 
defaulted under lease, landlord was not liable to 
supplier for value of such incorporated materials on 
theory oi unjust enrichment. 
Jack Fairclough, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
V. Pershing Nelson, Provo, for defendants and 
respondents. 
HALL, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment of no 
cause of action rendered by the district court. 
Defendant, Eldon Adams, is the owner of real 
property located at 1140 South State Street, Orem, 
Utah. He entered into a written lease with Great 
Outdoors, Inc. under the terms of which the lessee 
agreed to complete such improvements in and upon 
said property as its business needs might require and 
to pay and discharge all costs and expenses incident 
thereto to the end that no liens would be placed on the 
leased property. Great Outdoors, Inc. thereafter 
contracted with plaintiff for the purchase of materials 
which were ultimately furnished and incorporated into 
the building on the leased premises. The appellant 
was not privy to that agreement. Great Outdoors 
subsequently defaulted in the performance of the 
covenants of said lease and by court judgment the 
lease was terminated and the property restored to 
defendant. Plaintiff filed no lien against the lessee's 
interest in the property and the time limited for filing 
has expired. 
Plaintiff has never instituted suit against the lessee 
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and brought this action directly against the defendant 
on a theory of unjust enrichment. 
The foregoing recitation of facts are those stipulated 
to by the parties at the time they presented their 
respective motions for summary judgment to the trial 
court. 
*774 [1] This appeal may be disposed of by the 
application of some very elementary principles of law. 
As a general rule, a tenant's creditors have no greater 
right to charge the land with the value of 
improvements or repairs than the tenant would have 
(FN1) and here the tenant had no such right having 
contracted it away. 
The right of plaintiff to recover for the goods 
incorporated into defendant's real property must be 
based upon an agreement, either express or implied, 
and the stipulated facts are clear that none existed. 
Plaintiff placed no reliance at all on the credit of 
defendant and the lease agreement specifically 
imposed upon the lessee the sole obligation of 
payment. A case in point is Howard v. Societa Di 
Unione E Beneficenza Italiana, et al.. 62 Cal.App.2d 
842, 145 P.2d 694. 
[2] The mere fact that a third person benefits from a 
contract between two others does not make such third 
person liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or 
restitution. See 66 Am.Jur.2d 960. There must be 
some misleading act, request for services, or the like, 
to support such an action. Mere failure of 
performance by one of the contracting parties does not 
give rise to a right of restitution. 
It is also noted that there was an express contract 
between plaintiff and the lessee for the furnishing of 
materials, and when an express agreement exists one 
may not be implied. (FN2) 
[3] The action brought by plaintiff is one in equity 
and brought without any attempt to exhaust any legal 
remedies available. Also, the stipulated facts are that 
plaintiff has brought no suit against the lessee nor did 
he initiate any action to enforce a mechanic's lien, if 
any he had. As a consequence, such lien right was 
lost by passage of time. Nor has plaintiff shown any 
legal and sufficient excuse for his inaction agaiast the 
lessee. 
The authorities cited by plaintiff are distinguishable 
on the facts presented here and do not compel support 
of its position. 
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Judgment affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
ELLETT, C.J., and WILKINS, J., concur. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting): 
Defendant is the owner of property located in Or em, 
Utah. In March 1974, the defendant leased the 
property to Great Outdoors, Inc. (hereinafter, lessee). 
Under the terms of the lease, Great Outdoors agreed 
to make improvements in the property and to operate 
a health spa business thereon. 
Lessee contracted with the plaintiff to install certain 
fixtures. Plaintiff performed the contract at a cost of 
53,149.87. Lessee did not pay the plaintiff, and 
subsequently defaulted on the lease. Defendant lessor 
brought a successful action to regain possession of the 
property. After taking possession, the defendant 
continued to operate a health spa business on the 
premises under the name New Life Health Spa. 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover costs for 
materials and labor furnished. On simultaneous 
motions for summary judgment, the lower court held 
for the defendant finding the plaintiff failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. This Court 
should reverse. 
The theory of plaintiff's case is that the defendant 
has been unjustly enriched at plaintiff's expense and 
should, therefore, make restitution to the plaintiff. 
The lower court found the plaintiff was precluded 
from maintaining this action, because there was no 
privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant. 
This finding mistakes the nature of a claim based on 
unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is premised on 
a theory of quasi-contract, or a contract implied in 
law. 
A contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but 
an obligation imposed by *775 law for the purpose 
of bringing about justice and equity without 
reference to the intent or the agreement of the 
parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement 
between the parties. (Emphasis supplied.) 
It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated 
procedurally as if it were a contract . . . . (Emphasis 
in original.) (FN1) 
The plaintiff's cause of action does not fail for lack 
of privity. 
Defendant referred to several cases he claims 
support the lower court's judgment. These cases are 
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distinguishable and do not support defendant's 
assertioas. For example, defendant claims, as a 
general rule, a tenant's creditors have no greater right 
to charge the value of the landlord's land with (the 
costs of improvements) than the tenant could have. In 
support of this position defendant relies on, among 
others, American Bonding Co. v. Pueblo Investment 
Co., 10 Cir., 150 F. 17 (1906) and Grizzle v. 
Runbeck, 74 Riz. 92, 244 P.2d 1160 (1952). 
American Bonding involved a suit by a tenant's 
creditor against the tenant's surety. The case turned 
on whether the tenant had agreed, by the terms of the 
lease, to pay for improvements and whether the surety 
had, by incorporating the lease into the bonding 
agreement, agreed to pay for the improvements upon 
tenant's default. In the context of interpreting the 
terms of the lease, the court stated a lessee may not 
make repairs at the expense of the lessor unless there 
is an express agreement between them to do so. 150 
F. at 28. There is no question in this case that the 
tenant agreed to pay for the material and labor 
furnished, both parties agree that he did. The 
question here is whether, as between plaintiff and 
defendant, defendant has been unjustly enriched: not 
whether the tenant defaulted on his obligation. The 
Grizzle case is also distinguishable. In that case, 
tenants brought suit against the landlord for the costs 
of repairs. The case turned on whether the landlord 
was under a duty to repair and the court held that 
without an agreement to the contrary the landlord was 
under no such duty. The question of the landlord's 
duty to the tenant is not involved here. 
Defendant also relies on Howard v. Societa Di 
Unione E Beneficenza Italiana, 62 Ca!.App.2d 842, 
145 P.2d 694 (1944). In that case the lessor (Society) 
entered into an agreement with lessee for the rental of 
a baseball field. The lessee agreed to be responsible 
for the costs of repairs and improvements and then 
failed to pay for plaintiff's services. Plaintiff brought 
suit against the lessor claiming that lessor and lessee 
were joint venturers and therefore, the lessor was 
liable on lessee's debt based on a partnership theory. 
The court found no evidence of partnership or joint 
venture. The language quoted by defendant from that 
case is not only dicta, it was made in the context of 
determining the question of the existence of a 
partnership, and related to a finding of an implied in 
fact contract, not unjust enrichment. 
Addressing himself directly to plaintiff's unjust 
enrichment claim, defendant argues that plaintiff's 
claim is barred because the enrichment of defendant 
was not unjust. Defendant cites a number of cases in 
support of this proposition, including Buell v. Orion 
State Bank, 327 Mich. 43, 41 N.W.2d 472 (1950); 
Uischig v. McClone, 16 Wis.2d 506, 114 N.W.2d 
854 (1962). The Buell case involved a transfer of 
stock that at the time of the transfer was of 
questionable value. The stock later became worth a 
great deal of money. Plaintiff brought suit claiming 
that when her husband transferred the stock he was 
not competent and that defendant had been unjustly 
enriched by the transfer. The court held the decedent 
was competent to make the transfer and although the 
defendant was enriched, he had taken coasiderable 
risk in accepting the *776 stock and his enrichment 
was not unjust. The services of plaintiff, here, were 
not of questionable value and defendant took no risk 
in accepting them. The Utschig case involved a suit 
by a subcontractor against a homeowner for the value 
of labor and materials furnished. The court held that 
a subcontractor could not maintain an action against 
the homeowner unless there was an express agreement 
between the two that the homeowner would be 
respoasible for the debts of the principal contractor. 
The court stated that the homeowner was not liable on 
an implied contract simply because he had received 
services or goods. The court was not clear whether it 
was talking about an implied in fact contract or one 
implied in law. However, the case would not seem 
applicable here. The rules preventing a subcontractor 
from seeking payment directly from homeowners are 
based on the assumption that the homeowner has 
already paid the principal contractor and cannot be 
held liable twice on the same debt. That is not the 
case here. The other cases cited by defendant are 
similarly unpersuasive. 
The question, then, remaias has the defendant beer, 
enriched and is enrichment unjust. As was stated in 
Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 337 
(1947): 
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has 
and retains money or benefits which in justice and 
equity belong to another. . . . The benefit may be 
an interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in 
action; beneficial services conferred; satisfaction of 
a debt or duty owed by him; or anything which adds 
to his security or advantage. 
On the facts of the Baugh case, the court held 
against the plaintiff. The case is, however, clearly 
distinguishable from the facts at hand and the general 
definition given of unjust enrichment is applicable to 
the case at bar. See also, Fleming v. Wineberg, 253 
Or. 472, 455 P.2d 600 (1969). It would seem clear 
the defendant has been enriched. Improvements were 
made to his property that made it possible for him to 
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run a health spa business on the premises. In the 
lease the defendant required that these improvements 
be made. Presumably, the defendant would not have 
required these improvements if he did not expect to 
benefit from them. 
Defendant did in fact regain possession of the 
property and is running a business with the aid of 
improvements that, without the lease, he would have 
had to pay for himself. In other words, defendant has 
obtained the benefit of plaintiff's services without 
having to pay for them. The case of Paschall's, Inc. 
v. Dozier, supra, is directly in point. In that case the 
daughter of the defendant contracted with the plaintiff 
to remodel a bathroom in defendant's house. The 
daughter was living with the defendant at the time. 
Plaintiff performed the services, but the daughter was 
unable to pay. Plaintiff sued the defendant 
homeowner on a theory of unjust enrichment. The 
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to restitution. 
The court stated: 
The defendant asserts that an implied undertaking 
cannot arise against one benefited by the work 
performed, where the work is done under a special 
contract with another. While this may be the 
general rule, we do not think that it is applicable in 
every case. Indisputably, where one is afforded 
recovery from the person with whom he has a 
contract, he cannot also recover from third persoas 
incidentally benefited by his performance. . . . 
However, the situation is dissimilar where a person 
furnishes material and labor under a contract for the 
benefit of a third party and that contract becomes 
unenforceable or invalid. In that situation there is 
certainly no reason to preclude the furnisher . . . 
from seeking recovery agaiast the third person on 
the theory of (unjust enrichment). 407 S.W.2d at 
154--155. (FN2) 
While it is true, as defendant notes, that in these 
cases the defaulting party and the *777. defendant 
had some special relationship (father/daughter, 
mother/son, etc.) the basic reasoning of the cases 
applies to the facts at hand. In the case at bar, 
plaintiff entered into a contract with a defaulting 
party. That contract was at least in part for the 
benefit of a third party-the defendant. The contract 
has become unenforceable, the defendant is enjoying 
the benefits of the contract without paying for them. 
The question to be answered in an unjust enrichment 
is, do justice and equity require that the defendant be 
forced to make restitution. Under the facts of this 
case, they do so require. 
The plaintiff is not precluded by the Uniform 
Commercial Code from pursuing the remedy of 
restitution. Section 70A--1--103, U.C.A., provides 
that the principles of law and equity supplement the 
Code and are not usurped by it. 
From the foregoing it can be seen that summary 
judgment was not proper. This being an action in 
equity, a wider exploration of the facts is called for. I 
would reverse and remand for an evidentiary 
determination of the central question, 'Why should 
plaintiff not recover.' 
CROCKETT, J., concurs in Justice MAUGHAN'S 
dissent. 
FNl . 49 Am.Jur.2d 702, Section 765, citing 
authorities. 
FN2. 66 Am.Jur.2d 948, Section 6, citing Verdi v. 
Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 196 P. 225, 15 
A.L.R. 641. 
F N l . Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 
95 Idaho 739, 518 P.2c 1201, 1205 (1974). As 
stated in Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 219 Term. 45, 
407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (1966): 'It is well established 
that want of privity between parties is no obstacle to 
recovery under quasi-contract.' See also: Fowler v. 
Taylor, Utah, 554 P.2d 205 (1976); Rapp v. Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 527 P.2d 651 (1974); Trollope v. 
Koerner, 106 Ariz. 210, 470 P.2d 91 (1970). 
FN2. See also, De Gasperi v. Valicent, 198 
Pa.Super. 455, 181 A.2d 862 (1962); Karon v. 
Kellogg, 195 Minn. 134, 261 N.W. 861 (1935); 
Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146 
S.E.2d 434 (1966). 
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